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This paper aims to provide a brief assessment of the legal framework of the newly 
established metropolitan cities in the Italian domestic legal order. After an historical 
overview of previous attempts to set up metropolitan cities in Italy (1), it summarizes the 
main statutory provisions of the Delrio Law (No. 56/2014) through which metropolitan 
cities finally came into operation (2) and it provides an analysis of its implementation, 
thereby attempting to make clear whether increased institutional pluralism and 
differentiation in the local government system will strengthen or weaken Italian regionalism 
(3). The conclusion will argue that, while the enactment of local government reforms 
combined with the entering into force of a significant constitutional amendment will 
increasingly diminish the role of the Regions, metropolitan cities, due to their ambivalent 
nature, still lack any propulsive thrust and face the risk of being marginalized until a 
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1. Metropolitan Cities as Territorial Autonomous Entities: Just Law on 
Paper (1990-2014) 
 
The idea of establishing new institutional frameworks for governing metropolitan areas 
in Italy has become a significant political issue, since at least the 1980s, when the first 
legislative proposals were submitted to the Italian ParliamentI. Yet, through the 1950s, and, 
increasingly, in the ‘60s and ‘70s, scholars from different disciplines, especially town 
planners, pointed out that several policies related to urban agglomerations, such as 
commuting, congestion and pollution could be better addressed through new 
administrative entities that would integrate large urban centers and satellite towns into new 
units, rather than sticking with a poor and fragmented system through inter-municipal co-
operationII. However, after their establishment in the 1970s, the Italian Regions with 
Ordinary Statutes of Autonomy had to cope with the structural inadequacy of the tools and 
organisational schemes provided by administrative law at that time; the delegation of 
functions to municipalities and provinces occurred without any real chance of taking into 
account territorial, economic and social differences at their core (former Article 118 IC). 
For a long time, therefore, inter-municipal co-operation rather than the creation of new 
local government units was the only tool for addressing metropolitan problemsIII. 
A first legislative reference to metropolitan cities as new territorial entities can be traced 
back to State Law No. 142/1990, which marked a relevant step towards the recognition of 
the principle of differentiation in structuring the Italian local government system. Until that 
time decentralised administrative authorities were structured following the principle of 
uniformity, whereby they ought to be charged with the same administrative tasks and 
endowed with the same organizational rules across the whole country (former Article 128 
IC)IV. Homogeneity and uniformity, rooted in the Napoleonic model of public 
administration, were progressively abandoned in favor of differentiation, thereby enabling 
the establishment of different kinds of local authorities carrying out different tasks according 
to different rules in different areas of the territory of the Republic. As such, the principle of 
differentiation was conceived as a decisive means for fostering institutional pluralism and 
therefore also to promote local autonomy, as required by Article 5 IC.  
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Thus, one has to place the recognition of metropolitan cities by Italian legislation 
within this theoretical background. However, despite their formal legal recognition, 
metropolitan cities were not immediately brought into being because of the complicated 
procedure set out by State Law No. 142/1990 for their establishment, where Article 17 
stipulated that ordinary Regions could demarcate the boundaries of the metropolitan areas 
upon consultation with municipalities and provinces. The exact definition of the areas, 
which was not binding but discretionary, had to occur ‘with reference to the municipalities of 
Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Bari and Naples and all other municipalities 
enjoying a high degree of connection and integration with the latter in terms of economic development, delivery 
of public services and territorial conformation’. Because of Regions’ failure to comply with this 
procedure, metropolitan cities could not be established at that time. A further attempt, with 
the enactment of State Law No. 265/1999, failed once again. This time a definition of the 
metropolitan areas was made binding, but their territorial demarcation was more flexible, 
since it did not necessarily imply the creation of a new unit, but allowed for a bottom-up 
establishment of co-operational arrangements of a supra-municipal nature between the 
main urban center and a restricted area of municipalitiesV. 
With the 2001 constitutional amendment metropolitan cities were entrenched into the 
Constitution and became, together with municipalities, Provinces, Regions and the State 
constitutive entities of the Italian Republic (Article 114, para. 1 IC). Even after this 
recognition by constitutional guarantee of metropolitan cities, no agreement could be 
reached as to their establishment. The constitutional legal framework was not as clear as it 
could have been since Article 114 IC did not provide any definition and/or demarcation of 
metropolitan cities, although Article 117, para. 2 lett. p) IC did set out the State’s 
requirement to act, and in particular to set out their electoral system, the governing bodies 
and their fundamental functions. These provisions notwithstanding, no clarity existed as to 
whether the State or the Regions enjoyed the ultimate power to formally establish them or 
whether municipalities should have played a proactive role in this process. The new self-
governing entities were enumerated again by Articles 23 and 24 of State Law No. 42/2009 
on ‘fiscal federalism’ and Reggio Calabria was added to the list. Therein, a first vague list of 
fundamental functions was sketched out and a bottom-up procedure for their 
establishment was provided by the law to ensure a quick implementation of the new legal 
framework governing fiscal relations among subnational entities. Yet, again, no 
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establishment of metropolitan cities followed. A last unsuccessful effort to set them up was 
made by the government of Mario Monti with the enactment of Law Decree No. 95/2012, 
which was eventually struck down by the Italian Constitutional Court on formal groundsVI. 
As a consequence of the legislature’s repeated failure to implement the Constitution, 
metropolitan cities thus remained for almost fourteen years the only ‘constitutive entity of the 
Republic’ existing only on paper (Article 114, para. 1 IC). One of the main reasons for this 
striking failure was the cross-fire of vetoes on the part of the Provinces and of the Regions, 
fearing their marginalization, and the vetoes of the municipalities within the metropolitan 
areas, afraid of becoming mere subjects of the needs of the main urban center, or their 
amalgamation by the corresponding Region (Mantini 1996: 23 and ff.). Another issue was 
uncertainty as to the very concept of ‘metropolitan area’, so that the metropolitan city 
model was often conceived as a uniform and rigid one which had to fit in for all the 
different urban agglomerations in Italy without any clear scheme as to how relationships 
with other entities at the grassroots, in particular municipalities and Regions, should work.  
 
2. The 2014 Local Government Reform (Delrio Law): Metropolitan 
Cities as New Provinces ‘with Reinforced Powers’? 
 
With the enactment of Law No. 56/2014, the ‘Delrio Law’VII, metropolitan cities were 
finally established according to a relatively clear-cut and centralistic procedure (Article 1, § 
5 and 6), thereby ensuring not only geographical contiguity but also that the new 
authorities could start operating with no delay. Here, Regions were kept out of this 
procedure; it was an ordinary State Law which set metropolitan cities upVIII. 
The Law listed once again their names (Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, 
Florence, Rome, Bari, Naples and Reggio Calabria)IX and mandated they would 
automatically supersede the corresponding provinces by January 1, 2015, therefore 
coexisting with all municipalities within their jurisdiction. In other words, municipalities 
would have not been pooled together into a big metropolitan city. Yet, they could have 
decided to opt out and be attached to one of the already existing Provinces nearby. 
Similarly, municipalities outside the jurisdiction of the old Provinces could have opted in 
and become part to the new metropolitan city. Since a final decision in this respect was in 
the State’s purview, the boundaries of metropolitan areas were not changed at allX. 
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In its Judgment No. 50 (2015), the Italian Constitutional Court declared the 
aforementioned provisions as compatible with the Italian Constitution, by virtue of the 
nature of the matter: the establishment of a constitutive entity of the Republic can only 
reside within the State and not within the Region. No violation of the constitutional rule 
governing the procedure for changing the provincial boundaries could be found either, 
since the legislature effectively passed, so to say, a structural local government reform, 
whereas the constitutional provision providing for a bottom-up and proactive role of 
municipalities and provinces (Article 133, para. 1 IC) applies only when single boundary 
modifications are concerned [§ 3.4.1 and § 3.4.2]. These principles were eventually 
embodied in one of the constitutional amendments (Article 40, para. 4) of the 
constitutional reform awaiting confirmation by popular referendum next DecemberXI.  
The scope of powers and functions of metropolitan cities was roughly designed by the 
legislature drawing upon the example of the Provinces they had de jure superseded. Yet, 
metropolitan cities were also given additional responsibilities, in order to tackle problems 
typical of conurbations, including increasing commuting and immigration flows, pollution, 
economic development, social exclusion and misallocation of resources. In fact, according 
to Article 1, §§ 44 of the Delrio Law, they have been granted all the administrative 
functions already conferred to the Provinces as well as other basic responsibilities ranging 
from general spatial and strategic planning (thereby replacing or at least competing with the 
corresponding municipal and regional administrative competences), promotion of socio-
economic development, informatization and digitalization of the metropolitan area, road 
network and traffic regulation and organisation and management of services of general 
interest. Further tasks have been conferred by the Regions within the scope of their 
legislative competence. Notwithstanding the fact that metropolitan cities were expected to 
be charged with these additional tasks their personnel has been reduced by 30 percent by 
means of the very same local government reform, similarly to what happened to the 
Provinces. 
A residual, but not less important role, is played by administrative functions supportive 
of municipal activities (e.g. the: collection and analysis of data and technical and 
administrative assistance to local authorities). In this respect, municipalities and consortia 
of municipalities within the metropolitan jurisdiction are also explicitly allowed to both 
delegate tasks to the city, or to have functions delegated by it according to the subsidiarity 
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principle (Article 1, § 11, lett. b) Delrio Law). In particular, metropolitan cities are endowed 
with a very broad statutory autonomy enabling them (Article 1, § 57 Delrio Law) to 
discharge administrative functions on a more flexible basis (Article 1, § 57 Delrio Law). On 
these grounds, metropolitan cities can establish various ‘homogenous areas’ (zone omogenee) 
for carrying out given administrative functions due to specific territorial conformation 
specificities (e.g. for mountainous areas). These areas are not new local authorities, but 
rather geographical subdivisions in which tasks could be fulfilled in a more efficient and 
effective way by aggregations of municipalities or consortia of municipalities. For this 
purpose, specific bodies coordinating with the bodies of the metropolitan city will be set up 
following a possible agreement with the corresponding Region (Article 1, § 11, lett. c) 
Delrio Law), which therefore retains a role, though albeit marginal, in the organization of 
the territory within the metropolitan area. These ‘homogenous areas’ should thus serve as a 
means to disentangle possible overlaps of responsibilities or interferences between the city 
and municipalities. Pursuant to the Delrio Law, in fact, municipalities are expected to 
become the pivotal authorities of the Italian local government system, that is to say the 
only territorial authorities acting according to the general competence principle. They 
ought therefore to be set up in such a position as to organize provision of public services 
according to a bottom-up and flexible approach, and possibly continuing to rely on 
effective co-operational schemes they used before the establishment of the metropolitan 
city, such as public-private law agreements and conventions (convenzioni e accordi di 
programma). In contrast, the metropolitan city will no longer enjoy universal jurisdiction, but 
will only act according to the scope of its powers and functions as set out by law. As a 
newly established governing body, the metropolitan conference, an assembly of all mayors 
of municipalities within the metropolitan area (Article 1, § 7 and 8 Delrio Law), is aimed at 
further strengthening coordination between municipal and metropolitan activities. The 
marginal role of the Regions in this respect is confirmed by the pending constitutional 
amendment, which does not empower them with an exclusive legislative competence for 
regulating the general structure and organization of municipalities, but on the contrary 
upholds a restriction of their power to lay down general principles of inter-municipal co-
operation (new Article 70, para. 1 combined with new Article 117, para. 2, lett. p) IC), as 
developed over the past years by the case-law of the Constitutional CourtXII. 
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Finally, metropolitan cities are expected to inherit the tax revenues through which the 
superseded Provinces were funded; however it is still not clear whether additional taxing 
powers will be conferred upon to them by the legislature which, until now, has only 
committed the government to adopting new legislative decrees on funding for Provinces 
and metropolitan cities (Article 1, § 97 Delrio Law)XIII. The precise amount of resources 
available has, however, not yet been decided and as such the government has continued to 
finance Provinces and metropolitan cities on the basis of annual ad-hoc contributionsXIV. 
Since 2015, the State has limited funding to what it is needed for the discharge of 
fundamental functions, with the Regions being liable for the remaining amount (State Law 
No. 190/2014). In this respect, financial autonomy appears to be an issue of the utmost 
importance, given that metropolitan cities, as the Italian Constitutional Court puts it, are 
‘entities also enjoying a supranational relevance when it comes to access EU funds’ [§ 3.4.1]. In this 
respect, the National Operational Programme (NOP) allocated approximately € 900 million 
euros (two thirds of which were committed under the EU structural and development 
funds) to finance projects in all metropolitan cities until 2020, including those in Regions 
with Special Statutes of Autonomy. Other projects are due to be funded through Regional 
Operational Programmes (ROP). Yet, the absence of a clear strategy as to how ‘an EU 
Urban Agenda should help cities to implement European priorities’XV makes clear that metropolitan 
cities cannot rely merely on direct European (co)-funding, but on the contrary that they 
also deserve adequate financial support also by from the State, as Article 119, para. 4 IC 
mandatesXVI. However, at present only two out of ten metropolitan cities have budget 
surpluses, whereas the majority presents huge financial losses which could bring about 
sanctions by the central government on the grounds of a violation of the domestic stability 
pact (Trovati 2016)XVII. A recent, albeit totally insufficient, una tantum support by the central 
government, consisted in the 2 billion euros special funding of projects developed by 
metropolitan cities so as to regenerate their suburban communitiesXVIII. 
In essence, metropolitan cities are territorial authorities with their own powers and 
functions, distinct from those of the municipalities, by which whom they can however be 
delegated single tasks, which are likely to be funded not only via State or regional transfers 
but also by means of local taxes and chargesXIX, but in any case not by compulsory 
contributions of municipalities as it happens in other jurisdictions for second-tier local 
authorities (in Germany, for instance). On grounds of their territorial nature, one would 
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expect at least their main governing bodies, the metropolitan council and the mayor, to be 
elected by direct and universal suffrage. This, however, is not the case. Both bodies are in 
fact indirectly legitimized so as to avoid, insofar as possible, conflicting political views 
between municipal bodies and intermediate local authorities’ bodies. Furthermore, for the 
sake of saving public money, political bodies of metropolitan cities will not receive any 
remuneration or reimbursement of expenses.  
Article 1, § 25 of the Delrio Law, in fact, stipulates that the metropolitan council is 
elected by mayors and municipal councilors of the municipalities within the jurisdiction of 
the metropolitan city and not by the citizens living within the jurisdiction of the 
metropolitan city. Similarly, Article 1, § 19 provides that the metropolitan mayor is by 
default the mayor of the main urban center (comune capoluogo) and, since he is neither 
assisted by any executive body, nor he has to submit its acts for the council to approve, he 
enjoys even more power than the previous president of the Province. The Law provides 
for the direct election of the mayor and the council only as an exception (Article 1, § 22). 
However, the residual choice for direct election, which is devolved to the metropolitan city 
itself, but eventually requires the approval of a new electoral law by the Parliament, is 
subject to the fulfillment of two alternative conditions: the main urban center within the 
jurisdiction of the metropolitan city should be divided up into several municipalities or, 
alternatively, metropolitan cities having more than three millions inhabitants (i.e. Rome, 
Milan and Naples, for the time being) will have to establish ‘homogenous areas’ within 
their jurisdiction.  
The very purpose of these provisions was probably to soften the strong monocentric 
features of the metropolitan city model which appears aimed at strengthening the main 
urban center as a propulsive thrust, to the detriment of the other municipalities. This 
phenomenon is particularly striking in the metropolitan city of Turin, in which there is the 
highest number of municipalities (316) and where the metropolitan area extends well 
beyond the ‘narrow’ urban agglomeration up to the mountains at the borders with France, 
being therefore more of a ‘city-region’ than a metropolitan city. Therefore, it was for cases 
like this that the Delrio Law provided metropolitan cities with tools for disaggregating and 
ensuring more pluralism and democratic participation. Notwithstanding the corresponding 
provisions already set out in the metropolitan Statutes of Autonomy of Bologna and 
Genoa, the actual chances to bringing about such a shift towards a different metropolitan 
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city model are very few at the moment, since the whole procedure is dependent upon the 
agreement of the most populated municipality or main urban center, which only very 
unlikely would accept such a break up. Only in the case of Milan, Rome and Naples it 
appears more likely that such a shift succeeds. A modest, yet significant attempt to enhance 
democratic tools wherever possible is to be found in numerous metropolitan Statutes of 
Autonomy envisaging prior citizens’ participation and consultation at early stages for 
developing strategic, spatial and mobility plans, with participation drawn also at lower 
levels than the metropolitan one. However, given the basis of the electoral system designed 
by the aforementioned statutory provisions, which hardly can be deemed in conformity 
with Article 3, para. 2 of the European Charter of Local Self-GovernmentXX, there is a 
strong argument that the metropolitan city model is based on a structurally weak form of 
local democracy in which peripheral entities have little representation whereas the main 
urban center is the dominant and pivotal actor. 
To conclude, metropolitan cities have finally been established after almost fifteen years 
of non-implementation of the Constitution. The drive for their quick activation 
outweighed the necessity of complying with a strict bottom-up procedure, involving local 
communities in their establishment. Yet, by doing so, metropolitan areas ended up being 
designed not as ‘narrow areas’ (aree ristrette), but as territorial authorities ‘over large areas’ 
(aree vaste), that is to say also stretching to rural and mountain areasXXI, with little 
consideration for the underlying socio-economic structure and in particular for standards 
such as the overall population, commuting flows and territorial features. The new 
metropolitan cities are structured as provinces with ‘reinforced powers’. In spite of their 
strategic importance for urban development, they do not enjoy legislative powers and are 
not democratically legitimized by direct popular election, and thus find themselves at an 
intersection between, on the one hand, territorial authorities with their own powers and 
functions distinct from municipal ones, and inter-municipal bodies, on the other handXXII. 
Their unclear institutional nature is confirmed by the fact that metropolitan cities have 
abandoned the Union of Italian Provinces (UPI) as their umbrella organisation and have 
joined the Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI), even if they are not, strictly 
speaking, ‘municipalities’ but rather coordinate municipalities tasks. The re-allocation of 
devolved sources of funding, combined with the establishment of a clearer framework on 
allocation of responsibilities between metropolitan cities and Regions, will tell whether the 
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former can act as new thriving forces of the local government system, as equals or possibly 
even as competitors of the Regions. 
 
3. Reform Implementation and Constitutional Amendment: 
Metropolitan Cities vs. Regions? 
 
The actual impact of metropolitan cities on the Italian local government system firstly 
depends upon the full implementation of the Delrio Law and in particular on how Regions 
have been, and will be dealing with the allocation of administrative functions originally 
assigned to the old Provinces. It is, secondly, dependent on the entering into force of the 
constitutional amendment by means of which the Italian government cuts out the 
provincial layer of government as one of the constitutive layers of the Republic and 
upholds the guarantee of local autonomy for metropolitan cities only. 
The two reforms, in fact, go hand in hand. The Delrio Law was conceived as a local 
government reform anticipating insofar as possible the constitutional amendment passed 
this year and that will enter into force after the aforementioned popular referendum. As a 
result, the Provinces were hollowed-out by means of ordinary law, whereas the structure of 
metropolitan cities was minimally sketched out, on the basis of the provincial model, thus 
leaving it up to the Regions and to metropolitan cities themselves the task as how to 
outline their governance model. In this article it will be brought to view that, whereas the 
Provinces might very well be amalgamated into new bigger entities by Regions, but will not 
be fully repealed, metropolitan cities will either be involved in co-operative frameworks of 
local governance with the corresponding Regions or turned into passive recipients of 
decisions issued at regional level. At present, metropolitan cities have been conferred 
powers and functions overlapping with regional ones, yet at the same time they are still 
partly subordinate to the regional government and mostly dependent upon it for funding. 
This will be made clear by surveying the different Regional Laws enacted by regional 
councils and the metropolitan Statutes of Autonomy approved so far by the mayors of the 
metropolitan areas sitting in the so-called ‘metropolitan conference’XXIII. 
First of all, it has to be clarified that as of 2016, only the metropolitan cities of Turin, 
Milan, Rome, Naples, Florence, Venice, Bologna, Genoa and Bari started operating on 
time after the corresponding local elections took place in autumn 2014. Reggio Calabria 
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has, by contrast, not yet been constituted and will be operating as soon as of January 2017. 
The Regional Laws passed in 2015, by which the Regions reallocated administrative 
functions, and decided whether some of them had to be carried out together by different 
levels of government upon agreement, are grounded in the State-Regions Settlement dating 
back to September 11, 2014. Here, the Regions committed to involve local authorities in 
the procedure as well as to take into account the corresponding financial needs necessary 
to fulfill their administrative tasks.  
In the Piedmont Region, the legislative assembly passed a Law (Regional Law No. 23, 
October 29 2015) by means of which it set out the role of the metropolitan city of Turin as 
a territorial entity, both coordinating the initiatives of municipalities, and fulfilling old and 
new tasks of a supra-municipal nature. The same was done by the Liguria Region (Regional 
Law No. 15, 10 April 2015) and by the Tuscany Region (Regional Law No. 22, March 3, 
2015), which stressed the double and therefore ambiguous nature of the city as both a 
territorial authority with autonomous powers and as a functional entity for coordinating 
municipal activities. In contrast, the Statute of Autonomy of Genoa underlined that the 
metropolitan city represents the territory, the communities and the entities of which it is 
composed. The terms employed by the Statutes of Autonomy of the metropolitan cities of 
Milan, Rome, Venice and Florence are quite similar. In Rome, the Statute also mentions 
the special constitutional status of the Italian capital city and its significant role in making 
sure that constitutional organs and international institutions that have their seat within its 
boundaries can properly operate. A specific issue is how will the relationship between the 
metropolitan city of Rome and the capital city will be settled; in fact, while the municipality 
of Rome will have a special constitutional regime, the metropolitan city is already endowed 
with the same functions as the other metropolitan cities. In Campania, Regional Law No. 
66, November 10 2015 merely quoted the term used by legislation, whereby the 
metropolitan city is a ‘territorial authority over a large area’ (ente territoriale di area vasta). Very 
similar is also the definition provided by the Puglia Region with its Law No. 31, October 
30 2015. In Emilia-Romagna, Regional Law No. 30 July 2015 defines it as an authority for 
governing the metropolitan territory in a unitary manner, whereas the Preamble to the 
Statute of Autonomy of Bologna stressed its role as a ‘federative entity’ of territories and 
communities. In the Lombardy Region the ambivalent nature of the metropolitan city is 
emphasized by Article 1, para. 1 of the Regional Law No. 32, 22 October 2015, whereby it 
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is defined as an entity aimed at developing the welfare of both the territory as a whole and 
that of the municipalities. Only the Statute of Autonomy of Bari, by contrast, goes so far as 
to portrait the existence of a single local metropolitan community. Finally, it needs to be 
said that all Regional Laws make reference to the need for enhancing and strengthening the 
role of the metropolitan city as part of the regional local government system, whereas all 
Statutes of Autonomy highlight the need for preserving the different local identities 
existing within the metropolitan area, thereby constituting ‘homogenous areas’ as 
administrative subdivisions for delivering public services more efficiently and strengthening 
democratic participatory tools. 
As to the scope of powers and responsibilities, one has to consider, on the one hand, 
the additional administrative functions conferred upon to metropolitan cities by Regional 
Laws and, on the other hand, how metropolitan cities themselves structured their 
governance model.  
As to the former aspect, one has to further distinguish between the city’s own powers 
and functions, and mechanisms of co-ordination of municipal activities. As mentioned, 
most provincial functions have been reassigned to metropolitan cities by Regions. But, 
moreover, also additional powers and functions have been assigned to them. In this 
respect, in Piedmont the Law is pretty poor, since the Region conferred upon to the 
metropolitan city of Turin such minor additional tasks as: consultative powers, when 
decisions on ancient collective rights to use natural resources in private properties or 
collective rights over lands (better known as usi civici) are at stake, the powers to adopt the 
forestry and pastures plan (piano forestale), the organisation and management of the 
professional education and training system, the management of certain environmentally 
protected areas and previous provincial functions on public transportation. However, in 
the case of Liguria, the corresponding Law of Liguria was even poorer, since it retained 
many former provincial functions at regional level and conferred few additional functions 
to the metropolitan city, so as that the latter merely retains a consultative role on 
organisation of professional education and training. In the case of Bologna, the Emilia-
Romagna Region deferred to further laws the adaptation of the legislative framework to the 
role of the metropolitan city. Nonetheless, the Regional Law does stipulate that, for 
instance, the regional plan of the metropolitan rail service should be passed in agreement 
with the metropolitan city of Bologna. By contrast, the Law of the Lombardy Region 
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provides for a detailed specification of fundamental metropolitan fundamental functions 
on spatial planning, but also on water supply and on the unified management of parks. In 
Lazio, spatial planning extends to waste disposal and mobility issues for the whole 
metropolitan city of Rome. In Puglia the regional legislative assembly confirmed the 
attribution of functions on ‘active policies towards employment’, whereas it deferred to a 
further piece of legislation a survey concerning the division of responsibilities on public 
transportation between the Region and the metropolitan city. No significant innovation can 
be found in Veneto for the former province and new metropolitan city of Venice, whereas 
in Tuscany the Region endowed the metropolitan city of Florence with consultative powers 
within the regional competence of landscape planning concerning its territory. It further 
allowed the metropolitan city to replace municipalities and pass the structural spatial plan 
(piano strutturale) and give instructions to them as to how implement it (piano operativo). Yet, 
the corresponding Statute of Autonomy is very moderate in this respect and did not 
implement the legislative provision. By contrast, in the metropolitan cities of Rome, Bari, 
Milan and Bologna the spatial plan is intended to work as a binding reference framework 
for municipalities within the metropolitan area and could apply specific constraints on the 
spatial plans issued by municipalities. The Statutes of Autonomy of Bari, Naples and 
Genoa, in particular, endorse the expansion of the scope of responsibilities of the 
metropolitan cities, since they aim towards the enactment of one single building by-law or 
code for the whole metropolitan area, or at least one for each ‘homogenous area’. Finally, 
the Piedmont Region recognized and committed to the promotion of the role of 
‘homogenous areas’ as relevant subdivisions for avoiding fragmentation of public services 
delivery within the metropolitan city, and in which the strategic and spatial plans could be 
further detailed. These areas should be designed in accordance with the Region, but, as set 
out in the Statute of Autonomy, when there is a given majority within the metropolitan 
conference ‘homogenous areas’ could also be designed also without its consent. In this 
respect yet, it ought to be remembered that Regions retain the competence of defining the 
areas for optimal delivery of public services (ambiti territoriali ottimali) and thus conflicts with 
metropolitan cities might arise.  
As to the governance model, unlike the Regional Law concerning the metropolitan city 
of Genoa, in those matters in which the Piedmont Region retains legislative competence 
(promotion of social and economic development, in particular when it comes to 
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mountainous areas), the metropolitan city and the Region are required to conclude ad hoc 
agreements (intese). In other words, the Piedmont Region favors a cautious and cooperative 
rather than a confrontational approach with the metropolitan cityXXIV. If these agreements 
concern also actions and projects involving municipalities and consortia of municipalities 
the latter should also be able to sign the agreement. The role of coordination to be played 
by the metropolitan city in this respect appears therefore diminished, and bound to the 
ultimate will of the Region. Furthermore, a generic widespread collaboration is required 
where informatization and digitalization of the whole metropolitan area are concerned. The 
same applies to Tuscany and to the metropolitan city of Florence. In Bologna, cross-level 
agreement is required for measures related to the implementation of the strategic plan and 
is grounded in a Framework Agreement between the Region, the Provinces and the 
metropolitan city which was signed in January 2016. Co-operation is institutionalized from 
the outset also in the Regional Laws of both Tuscany and Lombardy, which foresee the 
establishment of a ‘Conference Region-Metropolitan City’. Whereas the Statute of 
Autonomy of Florence is overwhelmingly silent about the relations of the city with the 
Region, the Statute of Autonomy of Milan stipulates that agreements with the Region 
ought to be concluded by the metropolitan city for any kind of action planned on its 
territory, including building of new infrastructures. Moreover, in Lombardy, the regional 
government stressed its role of overseeing the relations between the metropolitan city and 
municipalities located outside the metropolitan area. In general, according to the same 
Regional Law, relationships between municipalities within the metropolitan area, the 
metropolitan city of Milan and the Region are under a very detailed co-operative 
framework. In Campania, the Region has not set out any co-operative framework, but it 
apparently aims neither to delegate functions to the metropolitan city of Naples, nor to 
endow it with a sufficient degree of autonomy with reference to the oversight of inter-
municipal co-operation within the metropolitan area. The same applies to the metropolitan 
cities of Bari and Venice. In Campania and Veneto, the Statutes of Autonomy of Naples 
and Venice only generally endorse the activation of co-operative pathways with the regional 
government in order to define the corresponding competences, but without providing 
further details. 
Metropolitan cities are further subordinate to the regional administrations in the sense 
that they depend upon them for funding. In fact, at present they are not endowed with 
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significant taxing powers and the Regions have been funding them using different schemes. 
Another important feature of the role to be played by metropolitan cities is their possible 
representation in the Senate, as modified by the pending constitutional reform. In fact, the 
new Senate is expected to represent various territorial entities, including possibly also 
metropolitan cities. Therefore, it might be argued that metropolitan cities will increase their 
political power not only towards the corresponding Region but also towards the State, 
insofar as metropolitan mayors or councilors will also be sitting in the new Senate together 
with seventy-four regional councilors; though, this depends on the final wording of the 
Law regulating the election of the new members of the House. At present, the 
constitutional amendment mandates that, out of one hundred new members, twenty-one 
mayors will be appointed by the regional councils of the corresponding Italian Regions 
with both Ordinary and Special Statutes of Autonomy. The Law, which will be adopted as 
soon as the amendment enters into force, could for instance foresee a specific quota for 
mayors of those big municipalities in which the mayor is ex lege also the mayor of the 
metropolitan cityXXV. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
More than twenty-five years after their first recognition by an ordinary State Law (Law 
No. 142/1990), metropolitan cities have finally been established, therefore aligning the 
Italian legal framework to that of other major European member States, and thereby re-
orienting its institutional system towards the development of robust urban clusters aimed 
at solving connectivity problemsXXVI. 
Metropolitan cities are hybrid administrative entities within the Italian local 
government system, representing both a metropolitan community, coinciding with the old 
provincial one, and also the various municipalities located within the boundary of the 
metropolitan area. The legal order of metropolitan cities is grounded on the principle of 
differentiation, thus enabling each entity by means of its Statute of Autonomy to extend or 
restrict powers and functions, as briefly sketched out by State and Regional Laws. Yet, the 
principle of differentiation does not go as far as to allow for the establishment of 
completely different institutional frameworks, one for each metropolitan area (as it is the 
case in other EU countries such as France, Germany or Spain), nor is regional legislation 
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allowed to transform provinces into new metropolitan cities, even if similar problems exist 
in other areas of the Republic, for instance around mid-sized cities such as Bergamo, 
Brescia and Verona. Here, only inter-municipal or, more appropriately, inter-provincial co-
operation schemes might help in addressing connectivity issues. Therefore, one could claim 
that the ten metropolitan cities established by means of law by the Italian Parliament in 
2014 enjoy the same institutional features, the most prominent of which is the dominant 
influence of the main urban center and the rather limited scope of powers and functions 
which matches to a large extent with that of the Provinces. As it is the case for the 
Provinces, the funding of metropolitan cities by State and Regions is also precarious so that 
its overall inadequacy, as ascertained, limited to Piedmont, by the Italian Constitutional 
Court [Judgments No. 188 (2015) and No. 10 (2016)], has until now unlawfully prevented 
the full coverage of costs for carrying out properly their administrative functionsXXVII. 
At the same time, however, metropolitan cities are conceived as entities in charge of 
spatial, mobility and strategic planning. All three powers are expected to be used coherently 
and consistently with each other. Yet, whereas metropolitan spatial planning might sooner 
or later result in a competence of groundbreaking importance, mobility and strategic 
planning may have a softer impact on municipalities, being more of reference frameworks 
than binding legal acts. In particular, it appears that three years are is too short of a period 
of time for a ‘strategic’ plan to be in forceXXVIII. Overall, metropolitan cities appear to enjoy 
in the first place powers aimed at avoiding fragmentation and bringing about 
harmonisation and simplification among different municipal rules and procedures as well as 
carrying out mergers and suppressions of a number of local utilities or other administrative 
structures (e.g. the reduction to one out of two water supply and/or sanitation public 
utilities within the metropolitan area of Milan or the merger of the ICT departments into 
one technical body within the metropolitan area of Turin or, furthermore, the appointment 
of one municipal secretary for both the metropolitan city and the municipality of Bologna). 
In a nutshell, they are more of planners of public policies than actors fulfilling specific 
tasks or public services for a given territorial community (Pizzetti 2015). Yet, Regions have 
been attempting, by means of legislation, to retain their role of coordination and direction: 
an overlapping of responsibilities appears therefore more than likely. In particular, at 
present, harmonisation and simplification of rules within metropolitan areas still await 
concrete implementation. While metropolitan cities, that is to say municipalities of the 
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metropolitan area, appear partly reluctant to take over the role of pivotal spatial and 
strategic planning actors, regional governments can play an important role in making this 
happen. However, together with the State, they can also make it fail. Thus far, in fact, they 
have been slowing down the process of empowerment of metropolitan cities (as well as of 
the new Provinces), by delaying the reallocation of the former provincial personnel and by 
denying or reducing adequate funding. 
Upon confirmation of the constitutional amendment by means of popular referendum 
next December, the progressive ‘regionalization’ of the Italian local government system 
might be stopped and even reversed. Regions with Ordinary Statutes of Autonomy will 
probably enjoy less power than today when it comes to setting up and arranging their own 
local government systems (Gardini 2015; Sterpa 2016), even if they will still enjoy the 
power to confer administrative functions to the Provinces within their - albeit more 
limited! - scope of legislative competence. In addition, they might be endowed by the State 
with the new power to pool together the existing Provinces (current Article 133, para. 1 IC 
will be in fact repealed), thereby being able to more consistently coerce them into co-
operation in order to fulfill certain tasks and achieve economies of scale (as set out already 
by State Law No. 78/2015). Yet, on the other side, the State will be conferred with the 
legislative competence to set out provisions concerning the general structure and 
organisation of ‘entities governing larger areas’ (enti di area vasta), i.e. the no longer 
constitutionalized Provinces (Article 40, para. 4) and, as mentioned, Regions will be 
prevented from passing legislative provisions setting out principles for the organization of 
inter-municipal co-operation. In this respect too, also the new Senate will have only a weak 
say, i.e. it will be able to provide the Chamber of Deputies with modifications proposals, 
but it will not enjoy any veto power (new Article 70, para. 2 IC). Furthermore, whilst still 
endowed with the power to establish new municipalities by means of Regional Law, 
Regions will not enjoy the corresponding legislative power to determine the differential 
organizations and structures of municipalities located under their jurisdiction and, more in 
generally, will not be able to depart from the legal framework designed by the Delrio Law 
by creating new local authorities, unless State legislation stipulates so.  
Moreover, metropolitan cities will continuously enjoy a constitutional guarantee of 
autonomy and will be much more dependent upon the State than upon the Regions as to 
the regulation of their general structure and organization (even if the new Senate is fully 
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involved in the legislative procedure accrding to new Article 70, para. 1 IC), as to how each 
function should be carried out and to the demarcation of their borders, as well as also 
being dependent upon the European Union for direct funding. In their own jurisdictions, 
metropolitan cities might therefore increasingly replace Regions insofar as specific 
responsibilities in matters of planning and inter-municipal co-operation are concerned, yet 
the latter will probably continue resisting this trend of hollowing-out, for instance by 
requiring the conclusion of specific agreements on certain issues, by giving instructions or 
by exercising some sort of oversight on given acts which should be coherent with those 
issued by the Region. 
To conclude, one might argue that two years after the enactment of the Delrio Law, 
the practice shows that, one the one hand, institutional pluralism at local level has been 
strengthened through top-down measures reinforcing the principle of differentiation, 
thereby making co-operative mechanisms between Regions and local authorities even more 
necessary. On the other hand, Italian regionalism as conceived by Italian constitutional 
reform in 2001 might be in crisis, not only on the grounds of the growing competition with 
metropolitan cities but most notably on the grounds of the constitutional amendment 
which is to enter into force as early as next year, if the referendum goes through. Over the 
past fifteen years Regions have not been able to stand out and gain appreciation and 
respect, neither for their innovative pieces of legislation, nor for the public policies they 
pursued, but they have evolved into decentralised entities of the State either delegating 
administrative functions to local authorities or carrying out administrative functions in their 
own name, therefore also competing rather than co-operating with Provinces and 
municipalities.  
The Delrio Law and the pending constitutional amendment uphold this general trend 
of regional ‘administrativization’ (Gianfrancesco 2014, Ferrara 2014 and Morrone 2016), 
thus formally reframing Regions from being territorial entities conceived as legislators and 
managers of local public services into public authorities carrying out or delegating 
administrative functions to lower local authorities or, at most, exercising the power to 
direct, guide, coordinate and orientate local authorities and the conduct of their financial 
relations. In this respect, therefore, unlike what has been emphasized by the different 
Regional Laws so far, competition rather than fruitful co-operation between Regions and 
metropolitan cities appears all but unlikely, both being designed as major ‘governance 
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bodies’ with structurally overlapping responsibilities. 
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